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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) often lack interfaces for re-
mote debugging. Thus, fault diagnosis and troubleshooting are con-
ducted at the deployment site. Currently, WSN operators lack ded-
icated tools that aid them in this process. Therefore, we introduce
EyeSec, a tool for WSN monitoring and maintenance in the field.
An Augmented Reality Device (AR Device) identifies sensor nodes
using optical markers. Portable Sniffer Units capture network traffic
and extract information. With those data, the AR Device network
topology and data flows between sensor nodes are visualized. Un-
like previous tools, EyeSec is fully portable, independent of any
given infrastructure and does not require dedicated and expensive
AR hardware. Using passive inspection only, it can be retrofitted
to already deployed WSNs. We implemented a proof of concept
on low-cost embedded hardware and commodity smart phones and
demonstrate the usage of EyeSec within a WSN test bed using the
6LoWPAN transmission protocol.
1 Introduction
Advances in low-power sensing, embedded computing and
wireless protocols drive the dissemination of wireless sensor net-
works (WSNs). After deployment, sensor nodes collect sensor data
and transmit those to a server for processing and storage. The server
is often connected to an existing IT infrastructure using a gateway.
Similar to enterprise-class IT devices, the WSN is usually mon-
itored by capturing network traffic at the gateway and displaying
node and link status to the network operator at a central control
terminal [12, 29]. However, after a device malfunction has been
detected, situations are different. While enterprise-class IT devices
can be managed actively using e.g. Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP), sensor node behavior can only be observed pas-
sively. Sensor nodes typically lack network management protocols,
because flash memory is scarce, firmware must be sleek and addi-
tional network traffic, which could interfere with WSN operations,
must be avoided. Hence, if sensor node failure is reported by the
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central monitoring system, an operator is sent into the field to pin-
point and fix the problem on-site. To be able to provide the opera-
tor with information on the network at the location of deployment,
Turon et al. and Bokde et al. describe hand-held devices [30, 11].
Those devices obtain information from the gateway. This is disad-
vantageous, as the hand-held devices require a permanent connec-
tion to the gateway and their operativeness depends on those of the
gateway. To become independent of the gateway as network traf-
fic source, separate and passive capture devices have been proposed
[23, 22, 32]. Consisting of mobile capture or sniffer nodes, they can
be deployed temporarily to overhear all WSN traffic.
Combining mobile capture networks and hand-held devices for
visualization permits the operator to work independently of exist-
ing infrastructure. However, by just shifting the visualization of
network data from a central terminal to a hand-held device does
not tackle specific problems encountered by the operator. While a
complete view on the WSN such as text-based traffic statistics and
large network graphs can be displayed at a hand-held device, the
operator needs only limited information targeted at solving a spe-
cific problem. Instead, the operator needs to map digital device
representation, i.e. network addresses, and the visual device repre-
sentation of the physical sensor node in front of him. This permits
to identify the physical device causing problems in the network. In
turn, while manipulating a physical device, the operator needs to
see the effects on the digital world, e.g. if a network connection can
be restored.
Currently, there exists no tool designed to provide the operator
in the field with just the information needed to debug wireless sen-
sor networks. To fill this gap, we propose EyeSec, a tool utilizing
Augmented Reality (AR) and tailored towards the operator’s needs.
EyeSec includes Augmented Reality Devices (AR Devices), which
detect and identifiy physical sensor nodes using Quick Response
(QR) code markers. Portable and extensible Sniffer Units capture
network traffic and extract digital information. Data from the visual
and digital domain are merged and stored at a portable Backend. An
AR Device obtains consolidated information from the Backend and
superimposes physical sensor nodes with this information. Data
flows and connectivity between sensor nodes are visualized. Un-
like centralized network visualization solutions, which display the
full network, we exploit the operator’s physical proximity to sensor
nodes to limit displayed information to exactly those he is inter-
ested in. EyeSec is designed such that Sniffer Units and Backend
can be installed ad-hoc at a WSN deployment site and removed af-
ter troubleshooting is finished, neither requiring changes to sensor
node firmware nor interfering with WSN operations at any time.
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Figure 1. Using EyeSec to monitor a WSN.
Our main contributions are:
• The first completely mobile WSN monitoring system, which
permits the operator to work independently of any existing
infrastructure, called EyeSec.
• Passive operation, i.e. no modifications to sensor node or gate-
way firmware need to be made. This permits EyeSec to be
retrofitted to already deployed WSNs without introducing ad-
ditional sources of error.
• Modular and protocol-agnostic design, so extra transmission
protocols can be added easily. EyeSec utilizes off-the-shelf
radio transceivers and Android OS smart phones, which are
available widely and cheaply.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section
2, we detail requirements and design considerations for building
a retrofittable and protocol-agnostic AR system. In Section 3, we
show how the design has been implemented in hardware and soft-
ware. In Section 4, we evaluate EyeSec in a real sensor network
using 6LoWPAN transmission protocol. In Section 5, we compare
EyeSec to similar tools. Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines
future work.
2 Design of EyeSec
In this section, the design of EyeSec is presented. Firstly, we
give an overview of the hardware units, which are part of EyeSec,
and how they communicate in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we out-
line how EyeSec is used and how usability is incorporated into the
design. Each of the hardware units, Sniffer Unit, Backend and AR
Device, is assigned a processing pipeline. We describe those pro-
cessing pipelines in detail in Sections 2.3 to 2.6. Finally, in Section
2.7 we discuss security design.
2.1 System Design and Communications
EyeSec consists of three hardware units called Sniffer Unit,
Backend and AR Device. They have been designed modularly, such
that hardware units can be merged or split depending on the size of
the WSN to be monitored. Any combination of Sniffer Unit, Back-
end and AR Device can be utilized. Figure 1 shows those hardware
units applied to a WSN. The WSN is displayed in the center. Every
sensor node has an optical marker. Two dedicated Sniffer Units,
shown to the top left and bottom right, have been deployed among
sensor nodes and passively capture traffic from the sensor network.
They extract data from traffic and transmit those data to a Backend,
where information is stored. The AR Device is a hand-held device
carried by the operator. It reads the optical marker of a sensor node,
from which it can derive the identity of the sensor node. In addi-
tion, it has an integrated Sniffer Unit. The AR Device fetches data
from the Backend and superimposes a sensor node with those data,
e.g. the name and location of the node.
Hardware units communicate using Wi-Fi. The Backend cre-
ates a protected Wi-Fi network, which Sniffer Units and AR De-
vices join. We chose Wi-Fi to connect EyeSec devices, as Wi-Fi
data rates exceed those of low-power transmission protocols used
in WSNs. Thus it is ensured, that even in large-scale WSNs with
high data transmission rates all extracted information can be ex-
changed in time. This ensures that communications do not become
a bottleneck. Additionally, since Wi-Fi can be operated in either
2.4 GHz or 5 GHz band, we can choose a band which does not in-
terfere with WSN operations. This ensures, that EyeSec operates
truly passively.
As all devices are part of the same network, they can be time-
synchronized using Network Time Protocol (NTP). The Backend
is configured as NTP server and can be equipped with a real-time
clock module. Sniffer Units and AR Devices are NTP clients,
which fetch time information from the server. Hence, we can utilize
time stamps in data acquisition.
2.2 Usage and Usability Design
The modular design of EyeSec permits the operator to split and
combine hardware units as needed to maximize usability. In the
first exemplary use case, the operator is sent at the deployment site
of a small WSN to pinpoint and troubleshoot an error.
For this task, he can utilize an AR Device with an integrated
Sniffer Unit, as pictured to the bottom left in Figure 1. Even the
Backend can be merged into the combined Sniffer Unit/AR Device,
omitting the need to place any separate hardware unit and provid-
ing the network operator with a single hand-held tool. While he
might not be able to capture all network traffic with the single AR
Device/Sniffer Tool, the operator is still able to inspect the sensor
node of interest and its neighborhood. The single combined Snif-
fer Unit/AR Device is sufficient to capture traffic to and from the
particular sensor node, which is currently inspected with the AR
Device. Using this setup, the operator benefits from high mobility
and zero setup time.
In another exemplary use case, a new WSN has been deployed.
The operator is sent on-site to confirm that all sensor nodes work
as expected. As this inspection likely has to be repeated several
times, until it is verified that long-time stability of the network is
given, the operator places multiple dedicated Sniffer Units such that
they can capture all WSN traffic. Additionally, he installs a sepa-
rate Backend. Depending on the estimated duration of monitoring,
those devices can be powered by battery or grid power. Utilizing the
hand-held AR device, the operator can approach sensor nodes and
check their status and connectivity. After having confirmed long-
time stability, he can remove the Sniffer Units and re-use them for
observing another WSN. At any future point in time, after having
conducted modifications or upon encountering failure behavior in a
WSN, EyeSec can be re-applied for monitoring and troubleshoot-
ing. Again, the portable and modular design of EyeSec is beneficial
as the operator can integrate it easily into his work flow rather than
being forced into a certain work flow imposed by restrictions of the
tool.
2.3 Digital Device Representation Pipeline
Each Sniffer Unit processes a Digital representation pipeline,
shown to the left hand side in Figure 2. Its input stage captures net-
work traffic. Next, it extracts communicating parties and associated
information from captured traffic. Extracted data are then sent to
the information storage at the Backend.
Block D1 Passive network traffic capture in Figure 2 needs to
account for the diversity of transmission protocols, which can be
encountered in WSNs. Among those are e.g. Bluetooth (Mesh),
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Figure 2. EyeSec processing pipelines mapped to Sniffer Unit, Backend and AR Device.
802.15.4-based protocols such as ZigBee 3.0 and 6LoWPAN, Wi-Fi
or LoRaWAN.
Since OSI Layers 1 and 2 (Physical and Data Link Layer) differ
among transmission protocols, we need hardware capable of pas-
sively capturing the transmission protocol of interest. Here, either
a Software-Defined Radio (SDR) or dedicated transceivers can be
used. While the former offer great flexibility, the latter are more
cost efficient, smaller and have lower energy consumption. Thus
for our mobile application, they are preferable over SDRs. Most
capture hardware outputs packets in PCAP format, which is the de-
facto standard for packet processing. This permits using established
packet handling tools such as Wireshark [9].
In block D2 Digital device representation extraction, the digital
representation of a device is obtained from captured network data.
This representation consists of its identifier in the network and as-
sociated digital information. Again, we have to deal with various
transmission protocols used in WSNs which use heterogeneous pri-
mary addressing. For example, Bluetooth uses hardware addresses
(Media-Access-Control addresses (MAC)) to deliver packets. Lo-
RAWAN uses a Device-EUI (Extended Unique Identifier), often but
not necessarily set to the MAC address. In contrary, 6LoWPAN uti-
lizes IPv6 addressing. To homogenize this building block, we need
a common digital device identifier, which must be derived from net-
work traffic. This must be accomplished using only passive inspec-
tion of network traffic, since EyeSec shall neither require changes
to sensor node firmware, nor interfere with WSN operations.
The hardware address (MAC) of a device is a suitable choice,
as it is present in every networked device and typically static and
unique within a network. Deriving the MAC addresses of network
members from the primary addressing depends on the actual trans-
mission protocol. Hence, processing block D2 must be adapted to
the network protocol of interest.
In block D3 Device information extraction from network traffic,
we obtain information such as packets sent and received. In mesh
networks, direct neighbors of a sensor node as well as the hops
a packet takes are of interest. We treat hops as individual packets
between neighboring nodes identified by MAC addresses, which we
have derived from the primary network addressing scheme in block
D2. In WSNs, which do not use mesh routing, EyeSec considers
the hop-size to be one. Since the MAC address is known already
from block D2, we can directly assign network information to a
particular sensor node.
EyeSec has been designed to utilize multiple Sniffer Units to
fully cover the sensor network. However, their receive radii might
overlap. Thus, a single packet might be captured by multiple Sniffer
Units. If no actions were taken, the Backend, to which information
extracted from packets are sent, would be cluttered with duplicate
information, falsifying traffic statistics as well as information dis-
played to the operator. To prevent duplicates in the database, we use
the following procedure. Upon packet capture, the Sniffer Unit cal-
culates a hash value of all data below the Network Layer using the
Message-Digest Algorithm 5 (MD5). Those lower packet fields are
static during the journey of a packet through the network. The Snif-
fer Unit transmits the hash value together with the packet data and
the capture time stamp to the Backend. Using time stamps is possi-
ble since the Sniffer Units and the Backend are time-synchronized
over the common wireless network, which they are all part of. Upon
receiving a packet from a Sniffer Unit, the Backend can search its
database using the MD5 hash value as an index, which permits ef-
ficient search. If a packet indexed with the received hash is found
in the database, time stamps are compared. If the difference of time
stamps is smaller than ε, the packets are considered duplicates and
the freshly received packet is discarded. Typically, ε is chosen in
the range of milliseconds. This accounts for varying packet travel
times between message source and the Sniffer Units and especially
for the precision limits of the time synchronization protocol NTP.
Else, if the difference of time stamps is larger than ε, the received
packet is added to the database.
We deliberately chose to let the Sniffer Unit create the MD5
hash and always send it together with the data to the Backend. One
might argue, that those computations are wasted in case the Back-
end considers data as duplicate and discards it. While this is true,
this design choice shifts computational burden from the Backend to
the Sniffer Unit, preventing performance bottlenecks at the Back-
end. If packets were transmitted without the pre-computed MD5
hash, the Backend would be tasked with calculating hash values.
With an increasing amount of Sniffer Units, the Backend would
face high computational burden, which would ultimately require
faster hardware, increase power consumption and reduce its porta-
bility. Thus, having the Sniffer Units calculate the hash value offers
scalability, as this permits the operator to use as many Sniffer Units
as needed to capture all traffic in the WSN.
EyeSec is protocol-agnostic in the sense that it is neither de-
pendent on special message types nor information only available
in a particular transmission protocol. With minor modifications to
the digital device representation, extra transmission protocols can
be added easily. Its homogenized output permits, that processing
blocks, which are assigned to the Backend and the AR Device, need
not be adjusted to a particular transmission protocol.
2.4 Visual Device Representation Pipeline
Every AR Device executes a Visual representation processing
pipeline, which is shown on the right hand side in Figure 2. In step
P1 Visual device presence capture, the actual presence of a device
of interest needs to be detected. In the second step P2 Visual device
representation extraction, the detected device needs to be identi-
fied. This distinction between presence detection and identification
has an impact on the technologies used to perform those steps. Us-
ing for example image recognition with mature frameworks such
as OpenCV, a device of interest can be detected reliably without
needing optical markers [3]. However, identification of devices is
difficult since networked devices share a similar visual appearance
and are not distinguishable from another [15]. Additionally, image
processing requires expensive computations, quickly draining the
battery of the AR Device. Hence, marker-based approaches are fa-
vorable over markerless solutions. Quick Response (QR) codes are
optical markers, which permit both detection and identification of
devices. They can be detected and read reliably by a camera. This
offers great flexibility in choosing the capture hardware. Each sen-
sor node needs to be supplied with a QR code. In the QR code, the
MAC address of the device is embedded. Upon identifying a new
sensor node by its QR code, the newly found device is announced
to the Backend. There, we now have the MAC address as common
device representation for both the digital and the visual world.
We are aware of the administrative overhead introduced by the
addition of QR codes. However, most of the time, industrial devices
are supplied with a printed sticker containing information on the
device, so the QR code can be added easily. Additionally, unlike
other approaches such as a sensor node blinking its MAC address
in a Morse code way using an LED, as discussed in [27], we do not
need modifications to the sensor node firmware. This brings high
acceptance, as extending the firmware always comes at the risk of
introducing new errors. Thus, using QR codes enables retrofitting
of EyeSec to already deployed WSNs.
2.5 Information Storage at Backend
The Backend is responsible for Information storage, shown in
the center of Figure 2. It receives extracted device information,
such as message transfers from one or more Sniffer Units and visual
device information from AR Devices.
The storage of the Backend is updated whenever new devices
have been identified in steps D2 and P2. The storage shall be the
single central instance in the system, where information is merged
and supplied. It must be ensured that no duplicate information is
stored. Thus, the design of this storage is crucial for the overall
system performance.
As visual and digital device representation are linked by the de-
vices MAC address, it is used as identifier for consolidating data
from both domains. A suitable choice for storing information at the
Backend is a database, which features fast write and read operations
and is capable of handling simultaneous accesses, for example write
operations of multiple Sniffer Units. Duplicate information can oc-
cur, if e.g. the same QR code is scanned twice or if a single network
packet is captured by more than one Sniffer Unit. In the case of
scanned QR codes, the Backend searches its database whether the
MAC address derived from the QR code is already present. To pre-
vent duplicate packets being stored, Sniffer Units send their data
to the storage combined with an MD5 hash identifier and a time
stamp. The procedure to check, whether a packet received from a
Sniffer Unit is a duplicate, has been described in section 2.3.
2.6 Output at AR Device
Digital information superimposition to physical device is the ter-
minating processing block. It is shown on the bottom right in Figure
2. In this step, the AR Device obtains information from the Back-
end and annotates sensor nodes with those.
EyeSec shall support common hardware for AR Devices to pro-
vide flexibility in the implementation and remove the need of ac-
quiring expensive dedicated hardware. An AR Device needs to be
able to acquire combined visual-digital data from the information
storage without requiring wired connections. Further, it must be
able to detect and extract information from QR codes placed on sen-
sor nodes. Simultaneous detection of multiple QR codes is needed,
as this is a common situation encountered whenever multiple sen-
sor nodes are within the camera image. Lastly, it needs to annotate
a device identified by a QR code with the visual-digital data, using
e.g. an overlay.
Due to their ubiquity and compliant hardware, smart phones are
suitable AR Devices. However, one could also use a tablet com-
puter or a notebook equipped with a web cam. We decided against
using AR Headsets, as they are currently more expensive and less
common than the solutions mentioned before. To create the anno-
tation overlay on sensor nodes, EyeSec uses custom line draws. We
could have also used established solutions such as Vuforia, EasyAR
or ARCore. However, the EyeSec app only uses basic features of
AR (recognition of QR codes and overlay view rendering). Thus,
most features of the advanced AR SDKs are simply not necessary
and would just clutter the app. Additionally, we are offered great
flexibility and neither need expensive licensing nor cloud access, as
it would be the case with the solutions mentioned beforehand.
2.7 Security Design
Besides ’natural’ failure due to sensor node death by e.g. drained
battery or bugs in the firmware, WSN operability can also be im-
paired by a cyber attack. For example, mesh networks can be sub-
ject to routing attacks, which cause network traffic to be misdirected
or dropped [19, 31, 13]. Besides attacking routing protocols, WSN
integrity can be assaulted by spoofing, i.e. copying a sensor nodes
identity to a malicious sensor node. This leads to network traffic
being attributed or directed falsely by the routing protocol.
While the MAC address is a convenient choice for sensor node
network identity, it can be spoofed easily by an attacker, as it is pub-
licly known. To prevent identity spoofing, cryptographically secure
identities for sensor nodes need to be used. Such identities can be
built using e.g. secret keys, public-private key pairs managed by a
public key infrastructure (PKI) or physically uncloneable functions
(PUFs). If a secure identity is available, messages can be encrypted
and then authenticated. The legitimate message sink node verifies
that the sender really is the entity it claims to be. If this verifica-
tion succeeds, the receiver decrypts the message contents. Else, it
discards the message.
EyeSec has been designed such, that it can be used with secured
WSNs. To be able to verify the secure identity of a device, a Sniffer
Unit needs to be supplied with this information. For example, each
sensor node could have a public-private key pair. The private key
is used to sign messages, while the public key is used to validate
signatures by message recipients. Thus, EyeSec needs to know the
public key of every sensor node, e.g. by giving EyeSec access to
the Certificate Authority (CA), which has confirmed that a specific
public key belongs to the address of a particular sensor node. Using
the public key of a sensor node, EyeSec is able to validate mes-
sage signatures of captured traffic and thus confirm the identity of
a sensor node. If validating the authenticity of a sensor node fails,
EyeSec concludes that the node uses a spoofed network address and
issue a warning to the operator, revealing spoofing attacks.
Targeting EyeSec operations, an attacker can attempt to copy
or forge the sensor nodes visual representation, i.e. the QR codes,
together with its network representation, the MAC address. Eye-
Sec creates a single visual device representation when the operator
scans the first QR code. Further, it sniffs traffic from both the legit-
imate and the malicious sensor node. As EyeSec has been supplied
with public keys, it validates the signatures of all messages. As-
suming the attacker has not stolen the secret key of the sensor node,
whose identity has been copied, the malicious node is not able to
forge message signatures. EyeSec tries to apply the public key of
a legitimate sensor node to validate the signature but will fail, as
the public key used does not match the secret key used by the mali-
cious node to sign messages. As a result, EyeSec reports the failed
signature validation to the operator.
In the case that the malicious sensor node does not transmit
messages, the signature validation is of no use. Traffic originat-
ing from the sensor node, whose digital and visual representation
has been copied, pass the signature validation as public and private
key match. However, if no countermeasures were applied, EyeSec
would visualize traffic originating from the legitimate sensor node
at the copied node, too. To prevent this, EyeSec issues a warn-
ing upon detecting duplicate QR codes. In order to distinguish the
legitimate from the malicious sensor node, signal strength measure-
ments can be conducted. Approaching the legitimate sensor node,
the signal strength of sniffed packets attributed to this sensor node
increases. Moving from the legitimate to the malicious node, sig-
nal strength of those packets drops since the legitimate node either
sends no packets at all or packets originating from it fail the signa-
ture validation and are thus discarded by EyeSec.
In the case that a QR code is copied, but the malicious sensor
node uses a network representation different from any other en-
countered in the network, the situation is slightly different. The
malicious node can now send messages using its own network rep-
resentation. However, those messages fail the signature check, as
the public key matching this network address is not known to Eye-
Sec. Network traffic from the legitimate sensor node would still
be visualized at the malicious node, but as in the example above,
EyeSec detects duplicate QR codes and issues a warning.
If an attacker uses a forged QR code, but has copied the network
address of a legitimate sensor node, the operator can add the mali-
cious nodes visual representation to the Backend. Traffic originat-
ing from the malicious node fails the signature check and EyeSec
issues a warning to the operator. As the visual representation of the
forged QR code does not match the network address of the mali-
cious node, no traffic is visualized to or from the malicious node,
which is noticed by the operator. Again, by observing the change
in signal strength of legitimate packets while moving between the
optically indistinguishable sensor nodes aids in identifying the ma-
licious node.
Lastly, both visual and network representation of a sensor node
can be forged. Network traffic originating from the forged node
fails the signature check, resulting in no traffic being visualized at it.
As before, EyeSec reports the failed signature verification attempts.
Pointing the AR Device at the malicious node, EyeSec hints that
this is the sensor node whose signature checks failed repeatedly.
To sum it up, MAC addresses are the common representation for
networked devices, which can be used with least effort and maxi-
mum flexibility. However, cryptographic means must be utilized,
otherwise attacks such as sensor node spoofing are possible. Eye-
Sec has been designed such, that it can be used with both secured
and insecure WSNs. It can handle cryptographic sensor node identi-
ties and aid the operator in detecting attacks resulting from spoofed
sensor nodes.
EyeSec utilizes cryptography to prevent remote attacks over the
network. The Backend as the central point of communication cre-
ates a wireless access point secured by Wi-Fi Protected Access Ver-
sion 2 (WPA-2) and Pre-Shared Keys. All RESTful HTTP requests
to the Backend require an Authentication Header. The authenti-
cation is done via user name and password. Every user name is
assigned a role in the database at the Backend. For every API end-
point and every HTTP method, we specify, which roles are allowed
to access this endpoint. If multiple Sniffer Units or AR Devices
are used, each of them has individual login credentials. If a single
device is compromised, we can revoke the compromised devices
permissions. Further, we can provide fine-grained access to infor-
mation at the Backend. A senior operator could be permitted to
add new nodes to the Backend, while a trainee might be given read
access only.
Currently, EyeSec is tailored towards WSN monitoring and
troubleshooting. However, having incorporated protection against
node spoofing attacks and by utilizing secure communications, Eye-
Sec is fit for usage in a hostile environment. In our ongoing re-
search, we are going to enhance EyeSec by adding detectors for
various attacks on the WSN, helping operators to spot more attacks
at a glance.
3 Implementation
In this section, we describe the proof of concept implementation
of EyeSec. Figure 3 shows hardware and software modules as a
block diagram, while Figure 4 shows the hardware units we used in
the evaluation.
Our implementation currently supports the 6LoWPAN transmis-
sion protocol using the Routing Protocol for Low power and Lossy
Networks (RPL), which creates a dynamic mesh network [16]. As
EyeSec has been designed to be retrofitted to already deployed
WSNs, the sensor network is not part of EyeSec and thus not dis-
cussed in this section.
3.1 Sniffer Unit
Sniffer Units capture 6LoWPAN traffic using a CC2650
Launchpad by Texas Instruments as transceiver, which utilizes the
Sensniff-Peripheral firmware shipped with the Contiki-NG operat-
ing system [2]. Captured packets are transferred to a Raspberry Pi
Zero W using UART at 460800 Baud. There, packets flow down-
wards the processing blocks displayed in Figure 3. First, the Host-
Sensniff tool converts packets to PCAP format and forwards them
to a pipe [6].
Next, to extract the digital device representation, we pass pack-
ets from the pipe into pyshark, a Python wrapper for Tshark [5].
There, the captured packets are being dissected into their layers.
Lastly, a custom packet handler derives MAC addresses from each
IPv6 address encountered in the captured packet. It extracts multi-
ple hops and treats them as separate packets.
3.2 Backend
The Backend is implemented on a Raspberry Pi 3. It is shown in
the middle of Figure 3. It creates a Wi-Fi access point and exposes
its services, e.g. the database and time synchronization, over a web
server, which is implemented with the Flask framework [24]. The
Sniffer Unit and the AR Device can interact with the Backend using
a RESTful API. For information storage, a PostgreSQL database
managed by the SQLAlchemy toolkit is utilized [7, 4].
3.3 AR Device
A Samsung Galaxy S7 smart phone running Android OS 8.0 is
used as the handheld AR Device1. The smart phone runs the Eye-
Sec App. In order to be easily extensible, the App is divided into
three submodules: Recognition, Core and Application.
The camera of the smart phone captures the environment and
shows the live image at its screen. For interacting with the camera,
the camera2 API is employed [1]. To detect and read QR codes, the
zxing library is used [10]. Using the built-in camera of the smart
phone, the 2 cm by 2 cm sized QR codes can be detected reliably at
distances up to 1 m and angles up to 45◦. All functions concerning
optical object recognition are grouped into the Recognition module.
Thus, if an even more suitable method for visual device represen-
tation extraction will be available in the future, this module can be
exchanged easily.
To interact with the Backend via the RESTful API, the volley
framework is utilized [8]. Functions used for web service access
are encapsulated in the module Application.
1EyeSec requires at least Android 6.0 to be able to leverage newly added
cryptographic features.
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Figure 4. Sniffer Units and a combined Sniffer Unit/AR Device used in the evaluation.
If a sensor node has been identified by the camera, but was not
found in the database at the Backend, the operator creates a new
digital representation of that sensor node by using the AR Devices
touch screen. Similarly, information on a existing sensor node (e.g.
location) can be altered.
For creating the overlay on its screen, the AR Device requests
data from the Backend. Our custom visualization uses Android
graphics canvas objects to draw a line between different node views.
The position of start and end of the line only depend on the cur-
rent position of the node views. Hence, only little computational
effort is needed to draw these views. Together with efficient QR
code detection, AR Device battery is preserved. In order to visu-
alize asymmetric connections, we draw a bezier curve between the
two sensor nodes. An arrow indicates the direction of packet flow.
Arrow stroke width increases in a logarithmic fashion with traffic
density. Classes needed to draw the overlay and visualize the net-
work data are encapsulated in the Application module, permitting
easy modifications and replacements.
Figure 5 is a capture of the screen of the AR Device, showing
the overlay. There are four sensor nodes (Sensortag 65, Launchpad
2, Sensortag 62 and Sensortag 63) and the WSN server (Launchpad
4). Each device is identified by its QR code and an overlay is placed
above the QR code, showing the name of the device and additional
information. Network traffic between sensor nodes and the server
is shown as arrows. It can be seen in Figure 5 that there is bi-
directional traffic, i.e. the server responds to a received packet.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we describe the usage of EyeSec in a real WSN.
Our testbed consists of six sensor nodes using CC2650 Sensortag
and CC2650 Launchpad microcontrollers. The sensor nodes trans-
fer messages using the transmission protocol 6LoWPAN. Routing
in the WSN is done by the Routing Protocol for Low power and
Lossy Networks (RPL), which creates a dynamic mesh network
[16]. Sensor node firmware utilizes the rpl-udp example, which is
part of the Contiki-NG operating system [2]. The example contains
both a client and a server implementation. One CC2650 device is
flashed with the server firmware, all others with client firmware.
Figure 5. Arrows indicate traffic between sensor nodes and
WSN server (Launchpad 4).
Each client sends UDP packets with an increasing number in fixed
transmit intervals of 10 sec to the server. The server replies with
the same number to the client. CC2650 devices have been placed in
an area of 1 m2 inside an office building. Each CC2650 is supplied
with a printed QR code containing the wireless interface MAC ad-
dress of the device. No further modifications to the sensor network
were performed.
To provide maximum mobility to the operator, the Sniffer Unit
is combined with the AR Device into a single portable hand-held
device. A separate Backend is placed such that Wi-Fi connectivity
between Sniffer Unit/AR Device and Backend is given at all times.
4.1 Investigating Hop Behavior
While monitoring a 6LoWPAN network, EyeSec can show traf-
fic either based on IP addressing or MAC addressing. The former is
shown in Figure 5 and can be used to confirm that every sensor node
has a connection to the WSN server (Launchpad 4). To gain deeper
insight into the WSN, the operator can switch to MAC addressing to
Figure 6. MAC-address based traffic view reveals hops.
reveal the hops a packet takes. This is shown in Figure 6. It can be
seen, that packets from device Sensortag 65 are forwarded by every
other sensor node, until they reach their destination at Launchpad
4. If no arrows originate from or terminate at a sensor node, this
indicates sensor node failure. Routing anomalies can be grasped
intuitively, if e.g. some nodes exchange traffic but have no route to
the server.
Besides helping the operator to identify sources of failure, the
MAC-based view can be used to optimize network topology. The
operator might identify a single sensor node, which forwards traffic
from many sensor nodes towards the server. Such forwarder nodes
are a potential source of network failure, as forwarding dense traffic
drains their battery quickly. This brings the risk of network parts
becoming isolated. To prevent this, the operator can e.g. re-arrange
node positioning or add a new node to provide a second route to the
server. Effects of those placement optimizations can be observed in
real-time with EyeSec.
The operator can choose, how long arrows between communi-
cating sensor nodes are displayed. With a short duration, single
Figure 7. Duplicate QR Codes raise a warning.
message transfers can be visualized. After the message transfer
has finished, arrows disappear. Choosing a longer duration, traf-
fic density can be visualized. Message transfers on a single route
are summed up, increasing arrow thickness as more traffic is ag-
gregated over time. This can be exploited to identify sensor nodes,
whose traffic rates are unexpectedly high or low, which could indi-
cate malfunction or an attack.
4.2 Duplicate QR Codes
Duplicate QR codes can occur due to errors during creation and
placement of those. Further, it can not be ruled out that there are
duplicate MAC addresses in networked devices. This will eventu-
ally lead to collisions while routing network traffic. Duplicate QR
codes can also be caused by an attack, in which an attacker tries
to spoof the visual representation of another sensor node by inten-
tionally placing duplicate QR codes. This could trick EyeSec into
attributing traffic falsely. Thus, on detecting duplicate QR codes,
EyeSec issues a warning and prevents the user from adding infor-
mation to either sensor node identified as duplicate, until the ambi-
guity has been resolved. This warning is shown in Figure 7. It must
be noted that in order to verify, which of two sensor nodes with the
same MAC inscribed in the QR code is authentic, cryptographic
solutions are needed. This has been discussed in Section 2.7.
4.3 Handling Sensor Nodes Out of Sight
Depending on sensor node placement, it can occur that only a
single sensor node can be acquired by the AR Devices camera. To
be still able to see traffic flows between the node in view and his
neighbors, EyeSec tracks the AR Devices rotations and remembers,
in which direction an adjacent sensor node has been seen previ-
ously. Thus, traffic flow can still be drawn between the sensor node,
which is captured by the camera right now, and the last known po-
sition of another sensor node, not visible any more. This behavior
is shown in Figure 8, where the AR Device has been rotated such
that the neighbor of Sensortag 62 moved outside the lower bound-
ary of the display. Arrows indicating message flow can still be seen
between Sensortag 62 and the last known location of its neighbor.
This behavior enables the operator to use EyeSec even in spatially
extended WSNs, tracing hops in a ’bread-crumb’ manner.
Figure 8. Traffic flows to devices not captured by the camera
can still be shown.
4.4 Investigating Network Behavior over
Time
As described in Section 2.1, captured packets are attributed with
a time stamp. To be able to see how network topology has changed
over time, the operator can utilize the full network graph view. An
example is shown in Figure 9. This view gives an overview of the
full network, showing all traffic captured either based on IP address-
ing as shown in Figure 9, or using MAC-based addressing, again
revealing hops. The operator can step through time and e.g. pin-
point, when a particular sensor node has failed and which effects
the failure had on network topology. By using this view together
with the MAC-based overlay shown in Figure 6, a WSN problem
can be traced down both temporally and spatially, supporting the
troubleshooting process.
5 Related Work
EyeSec incorporates technologies from many domains, such as
network data acquisition and information extraction, physical de-
vice detection and visualization techniques. We focus our discus-
sion on works, which are concerned with passive network data ac-
quisition and such, which focus on Augmented Reality-based visu-
alization of networks.
Ringwald et al. discuss the design of a sniffer network for pas-
sive WSN observation [23, 22]. Unlike EyeSec, which lets the oper-
ator interpret what they see, Ringwald et al. try to analyze the cause
for node failure. Further, their approach displays network topology
and additional information on a central screen, being more similar
to established network monitoring solutions. In contrast, EyeSec is
tailored towards on-site WSN monitoring and troubleshooting.
Figure 9. Full network graph permits viewing network behav-
ior over time.
Rauhala et al. implement an AR interface for sensor networks
on a hand-held device [21]. Their system visualizes readings of
humidity sensors placed inside walls, the location of sensors being
indicated by a unique marker placed at the wall. A similar sys-
tem has been described by Goldsmith et al. [14]. Both approaches
have in common, that the hand-held device, which visualizes sen-
sor data, has been integrated into the sensor network system. Thus,
retrofitting is not possible without altering the existing WSNs.
Sato et al. as well as Sakamoto et al. [27, 28, 26] present an
AR-based approach, which visualizes links and traffic between de-
vices as well as information on sensor nodes. They use a web cam
for capturing the physical world and a touch screen for displaying
the overlay. The touch screen permits interaction with the network.
For example, the user is able to ”cut” the connection between two
devices by performing a cutting gesture through the virtual cable
drawn in between. However, this interactivity comes at the cost of
the AR hardware having to actively interact with the sensor net-
work. Thus, the system can not be retrofitted to existing WSNs
without modifying sensor node firmware.
Sahin et al. use an AR smart phone app to visualize antenna radi-
ation patterns [25]. Devices are identified by optical markers. Their
experimental study shows, that the marker-based device identifica-
tion is a suitable approach and that visualization truly helps users
to understand, what is happening. However, as they are concerned
with radiation patterns rather than network monitoring, they require
a specialized setup using Software-Defined Radios (SDR) wired to
a processing server. Additionally, they need special software on the
SDR to provide information on radiation patterns.
Ohta et al.’s approach places an overlay over sensor nodes,
showing network topology and data flow [20]. They use marker-
based node identification. Usability of their approach is limited by
the fact that they require a wired connection between every mo-
bile device and the visualization device. Additionally, software at
each mobile device must be modified to provide information on the
packets being sent. Lastly, each sensor node must be able to com-
municate with the visualization device at all times. This is a major
drawback, since sensor nodes can fail for many reasons and the ex-
act purpose of an AR visualization approach is to help operators
identify and fix failed sensor nodes.
Koutitas et al. use a Microsoft HoloLens to show network topol-
ogy visualizations [18, 17]. As they have only released a demo
abstract, a set of slides and some demonstration videos, it is diffi-
cult to assess their system in detail. It seems, however that their
approach is tailored towards a given ZigBee network. Additionally,
they require dedicated AR headsets while EyeSec runs on commod-
ity smart phones.
Compared to related works, EyeSec has been designed for us-
ability and security. Unlike prior work, in which sensor nodes are
queried actively, our contribution uses passive observation solely.
This approach is significantly more challenging, as EyeSec can only
extract relevant information from observed network traffic. Thus,
our system has neither internal knowledge of the WSN, nor the pos-
sibility to directly query a sensor node for information. On the other
hand, passive observation is beneficial, as it permits retrofitting our
system. We consider this an important contribution for several rea-
sons. Firstly, sensor node firmware does not need to be extended.
Keeping firmware sleek, potential sources of error are reduced. This
increases sensor node availability, which we consider an important
property of WSNs. Secondly, by having less interface functions in
firmware, potential entry points for attacks are minimized. This
goes hand in hand with our detailed security concept, which to
the best of our knowledge makes our system the first AR-based
WSN monitoring tool designed with security in mind. Its modular
low-cost hardware and software design utilizing Augmented Real-
ity supplies the operator in the field with just the information needed
to solve a specific problem.
6 Conclusion
We have presented the design and implementation of EyeSec,
a protocol-agnostic and portable AR tool to aid network operators
in analyzing and troubleshooting wireless sensor networks on-site.
EyeSec utilizes one or more Sniffer Units, a Backend and one or
more AR Devices. The mobile Sniffer Units are placed temporarily
among sensor nodes. They passively capture network traffic, thus
no modifications to a given WSN are needed. The low-cost and
modular design of the Sniffer Units permits efficient coverage of
spatially extended WSNs. Support for additional WSN transmis-
sion protocols can be added easily. Visual device representations
are extracted from QR codes by the AR Device, implemented on
a smart phone. The central Backend consolidates information ex-
tracted from network traffic and visual device information. Those
are fed into the AR Device, which provides real time visualization
of connections, traffic flows and multi-hop behavior.
We implemented a real sensor network utilizing 6LoWPAN
transmission protocol. Using this network, we explored scenarios
commonly encountered in WSN troubleshooting. Our results show,
how EyeSec aids the operator in the field to pinpoint and fix those
failures.
EyeSecs distinguishing feature is its high usability. To opera-
tors, WSN reliability is paramount. Thus, already deployed WSN
firmware will not be modified just to support a new monitoring and
troubleshooting tool, as all modifications can introduce additional
sources of failure. Due to being retrofittable by operating passively
and independently of existing infrastructure, wide acceptance can
be expected. This enables EyeSec to be used in real WSNs, over-
coming objections of WSN owners and field operators.
In future research, we are going to evaluate EyeSec in a large-
scale WSN deployed in a factory environment. During this assess-
ment, we are going to conduct interviews with operators to further
optimize EyeSec towards their needs.
Currently, EyeSec can only handle valid packets. As strong in-
terference in the factory environment can be expected, we are go-
ing to add support for malformed packets by processing raw bits
received. Additionally, we are going to extend EyeSec for security
research in WSN.
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